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Institute Examination in Law
By Spencer Gordon
[The following answers to the questions set by the board of examiners of the
American Institute of Accountants at the examinations of November, 1935,
have been prepared at the request of The Journal of Accountancy. These
answers have not been reviewed by the board of examiners and are in no way
official. They represent merely the personal opinions of the author.—Editor,
The Journal of Accountancy.]
Examination in Commercial Law

November 15, 1935, 9:00 A. M. to 12:30 P. M.
Reasons for each answer must be stated. Whenever practicable give the answer
first and then state reasons. Answers will be graded according to the applicant's
evident knowledge of the legal principles involved in the question rather than
on his conclusions.
Group I

Answer all questions in this group.
No. 1 (10 points):
The Printing Company contracted with the Cook Company to supply sta
tionery to the latter during a stated period, on a cost-plus basis. The contract
defined cost as “actual cost of labor and material (including an amount of
administrative and overhead charges, attributable to the performance of said
agreement, satisfactory to the Cook Company, which said sum is to be deter
mined by the Cook Company after an audit and examination by the Cook
Company of the books and accounts of the Printing Company).” The Cook
Company, after its audit, notified the Printing Company that the overhead
charges made by the latter were not satisfactory to the Cook Company. The
dissatisfaction was actual and not capricious but was based on points in dispute
among outstanding accountants. Is the Printing Company conclusively
bound by the Cook Company’s position?
Answer:
The Printing Company is bound. There is a conflict of decisions as to
whether in such a contract the contracting party must really be satisfied, or
whether that satisfaction which would ordinarily be sufficient for a reasonable
man will be enough. The weight of authority is to the effect that the terms of
such a contract will be enforced if the parties act in good faith and not capri
ciously. Under this construction the Printing Company is bound. Other
courts hold in cases not involving personal services that only performance
which will satisfy a reasonable man will be required, and under such a con
struction the case would probably be sent to a jury. Under either construction
the fact that the dissatisfaction was based on points in dispute among outstand
ing accountants could be used effectively in arguing that the parties contem
plated that such difficult questions might arise and intended to leave them to
the Cook Company and thus avoid the delay and expense of litigation.

No. 2 (10 points):
A stockholder, exercising a legal right to inspect the financial books of
account of the corporation, brought with him a public accountant to advise
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him in the examination and to make transcripts from the accounts to be taken
away by the stockholder. The corporation’s officers refused to permit the
public accountant to see the accounts or to make transcripts therefrom. Were
they justified in their refusal?
Answer:
The officers of the corporation were not justified in their refusal. While the
right of inspection is personal to a stockholder, he may employ a skilled agent,
attorney, or accountant to make the inspection for him, if his motive is a
lawful one and if the demand is made at a reasonable time and place. Other
wise, in many cases, the possession of the right of inspection would be of no
value because of the stockholder’s lack of sufficient knowledge to exercise the
right effectively. The right to make memoranda, abstracts, and copies of the
contents of corporate records is an incident to the right of inspection, being
essential to an advantageous exercise thereof.

No. 3 (10 points):
John Barton was 19 years old and employed as a bookkeeper. He sub
scribed to a non-cancellable correspondence course in accountancy for which
he agreed to pay a stipulated amount. He completed half of the course, paid
one-quarter of the stipulated amount, and thereupon, at the age of 20, refused
to continue the course or to make further payments. What are the rights
of the parties?
Answer:
The contract of an infant is voidable and Barton may disaffirm it at any time
prior to his majority. Any tangible consideration remaining in the hands of the
infant at the time of such disaffirmance must be returned, but as there was no
such consideration in this case, the school has no remedy unless the contract is
considered one for necessaries, in which case Barton will be held for the reason
able value of the part of the course actually furnished him. In general, food,
raiment, lodging and education are considered necessaries, but only to the
extent reasonably required by a person of the means and position in life of the
infant in question. There are decisions to the effect that correspondence
school instruction is not a necessary, but in this case I think it would be held
that this course was a necessary to Barton, having in mind his age, his means
derived from his employment as a bookkeeper, and the probable effect that the
course would have on his future.

No. 4 (10 points):
In June, 1929, Herman was an internal-revenue agent entitled to certain
pension and retirement rights. On July 1, 1929, at the instigation of the X
Corporation, he resigned and entered the employ of the X Corporation under
a written contract which provided that during the rest of his life he was to
devote his entire time to the corporation as assistant to the president, for which
he was to be paid a salary of $5,120 per annum. On November 13, 1929, the
X Corporation discharged him without cause. Assuming that no question of
ultra vires was involved, what are his rights under the contract?
Answer:
Herman had a valid contract with the company. There was consideration
on both sides, consisting of his promise to serve and the company’s agreement
to pay him a salary. Herman’s remedy would be a suit for breach of the con
tract, the remedy of specific performance not being available to him because of
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his adequate remedy at law and because of the rule that the company could not
compel specific performance by him of personal services. He does not have to
wait until the instalments of his salary would come due, but he may consider
the contract is entirely broken under principles of anticipatory breach. His
damage would be measured by the present worth of the wage that would be
payable during the remainder of the term, reduced by the income which he has
earned, and could with reasonable diligence earn during the unexpired term.
This would be left to a jury. There are decisions, however, indicating that the
burden of proof would be upon the employer to show that the plaintiff found or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have found employment of some
kind reasonably adapted to his abilities, and that in the absence of such proof
the plaintiff could recover the present value of the salary fixed by the contract.
It does not seem to me that the fact that he had been an internal revenue agent
and was induced to leave his employment adds to the situation. There is ample
consideration for the contract without that, and on the question of damages
Herman cannot recover an amount equivalent to the pension and retirement
rights that he lost because if the contract with the corporation had been per
formed he would not have gotten his pension and retirement rights, and the
damages that I have indicated will compensate him fully for the non-per
formance of the contract.
No. 5
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

(10 points):
Define personal property.
Define tangible and intangible.
Define lien.
Define pledge.
What are the usual ways by which title to personal property is acquired?

Answer:
(a) Personal property is a right or interest in realty less than a freehold,
or a right or interest in a movable thing.
(b) Tangible means that which may be felt or touched: it must necessarily
be corporeal, but it may be real or personal. Intangible means something
incapable of being touched or perceived by touch.
(c) A lien is a hold or claim which one person has upon the property of an
other as a security for a debt or charge.
(d) A pledge is a bailment of personal property as security for some debt or
engagement.
(e) Title to personal property is usually acquired in one of the following
ways:
I. Operation of law:
(a) Marriage
(b) Judicial decree
(c) Prescription
(d) Descent or distribution
(e) Accretion
II. Act of the parties:
(a) Confusion
(b) Accession
(c) Gift
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(d) Purchase
(e) Bequest
(f) Finding

Group II

Answer any five questions in this group. No credit will be given for additional
answers, and if more are submitted only the first five will be considered.
No. 6 (10 points):
Mason and Dana were negotiating and Mason’s attorney prepared a long
and carefully drawn contract which was given to Dana for examination. Five
days later and prior to its execution, Dana’s eyes became so infected that it
was impossible for him to read. Ten days thereafter and during the contin
uance of the illness Mason called upon Dana and urged him to sign the con
tract, but without in any way misrepresenting the contents of it, and Dana
signed without reading it. In a subsequent suit by Mason, Dana claimed that
the contract was not binding upon him because he had not and could not have
read it prior to his signing it. Is Dana’s claim a valid defence?
Answer:
Dana might have a defence if any confidential relationship existed between
him and Mason or if Mason misrepresented the contents of the contract, but
his contention simply that he had not and could not have read it prior to signing
it does not present a valid defence. It is the duty of every contracting party
to learn the contents of a contract before he signs it, and if a person can not
read the instrument it is his duty to procure some reliable person to read and
explain it to him before he signs it. If he does not do this he can not claim
that he was ignorant of the contents.

No. 7 (10 points):
In what respects must a negotiable instrument be changed in order that the
change will constitute a material alteration?
Answer:
Under the negotiable instruments law any alteration is material which
changes the date, the sum payable for principal or interest, the time or place of
payment, the number or the relations of the parties, or the medium or currency
on which payment is to be made; or which adds a place of payment where no
place of payment is specified; or any other change or addition which alters the
effect of the instrument in any respect.

No. 8 (10 points):
In the absence of any applicable statute, what is a testamentary trustee’s
duty as to (a) amortization of premiums on bonds purchased by him, (b)
amortization of premiums on bonds purchased by the testator and acquired by
the trustee as a part of the trust fund, (c) accumulation of discounts on bonds
purchased by the trustee?
Answer:
In the absence of an applicable statute the duties of a testamentary trustee
on the points covered by this question will depend upon the terms of the trust.
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If there is no provision in the trust indicating the intent of the testator, the
trustee should act as follows:
(a) He should deduct a proportionate amount from the interest from time
to time so that on maturity of the bond he will have a sufficient amount to
have the principal intact for the remaindermen. The remaindermen should
not lose by the trustee purchasing bonds at a premium.
(b) Bonds purchased by the testator at a premium and placed by him in the
trust should not be so amortized. In such case the presumption is that the
testator intended that the beneficiaries entitled to the income should receive
the whole income without deduction for amortization.
(c) Decisions vary as to the duty of the trustee in regard to accumulation of
discounts. They are usually added to capital. In states where the rule is not
settled, the trustee should secure the protection of a court order or the consent
of the beneficiaries.
No. 9 (10 points):
The Surety Company was a duly organized corporation engaged in the
business of issuing surety bonds. In consideration of its regular fee, it became
surety on the official bond of a municipal treasurer. The treasurer defaulted
and the municipality took his six-months’ note for the amount of the shortage,
but the Surety Company was not notified. The treasurer failed to pay the
note at its maturity and the municipality sued him and the Surety Company
for the amount of the shortage. Upon trial it appeared that there had been
no substantial change in the treasurer’s financial condition during the interval
between the discovery of the defalcation and the starting of the suit. Was the
Surety Company discharged from liability when the municipality accepted
the treasurer’s note?
Answer:
The surety company was not discharged. The rule has long been estab
lished that a voluntary gratuitous surety is discharged from his obligation by
any extension of time given to the debtor or by any other change in the position
of the surety caused by the creditor without the creditor notifying the surety.
Such a surety would therefore be discharged by the suspension of the creditor’s
right of action through the acceptance of a six-months’ note. Under this doc
trine it was not necessary to show any injury to the surety. Many decisions,
however, now recognize a difference between a voluntary gratuitous surety and
a company which is engaged in the business of acting as surety for compen
sation, and hold that a compensated security is relieved from its obligation for
suretyship only where the departure from the contract is shown to be a
material variance which has caused some injury to the surety. Under this doc
trine the surety would not be released on the facts as stated.

No. 10 (10 points):
One of the maxims in equity is: “He who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.” State briefly the other principal maxims but do not elaborate
upon or discuss them.
Answer:
Maxims in equity are succinct expressions of the general principles of
chancery jurisdiction and the methods by which they are applied. There are
twelve fundamental and well recognized maxims as follows:
1. “Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without a remedy.”
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

“Equity regards substance and not form.”
"Equality is equity.”
“Equity follows the law.”
“Equity regards that as done which ought to have been done.”
“Equity imports an intention to fulfill an obligation.”
“Between equal equities, the law will prevail.”
“Between equal equities, the first in order of time will prevail.”
“Equity acts in personam.”
“ Equity aids the vigilant, and not those who slumber upon their rights. ”
“Equity delights to do justice and not by halves.”
“He who seeks equity must do equity.”

No. 11 (10 points):
(a) What are the principal kinds or types of insurance?
(b) What is the legal reason why insurance is lawful although bets and
wagers usually are unlawful?
(c) What is meant by insurable interest?
(d) Give an example of subrogation in relation to insurance.
(e) What is meant by general average?
Answer:
(a) Among the principal kinds or types of insurance are life, fire, accident,
cyclone and tornado, automobile, liability insurance, fidelity, industrial, in
demnity, marine, casualty, and burglary and theft.
(b) A wager contemplates a payment depending upon the outcome of events
which are uncertain, and in the outcome of which the wagering party does not
have an interest. A person is richer or poorer as a result of the outcome of the
wager. This is unlawful because of public policy against gambling. Insurance,
on the other hand, is an agreement by which one person for a consideration
promises to pay money or its equivalent or to do some act of value to another
on the destruction or injury of something by specified perils. This does not
involve gambling because the insured pays an amount which is calculated to
be sufficient to cover the expense of the protection in accordance with ex
perience tables.
(c) An insurable interest is an interest in the subject of the insurance. Such
an interest is necessary in order to entitle one to obtain insurance. Thus one
has an insurable interest in the life of another where he has some financial gain
to expect from the other’s continued existence or some loss to suffer by the
other’s death.
(d) On payment of a loss the insurer acquires the right to be subrogated
pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against a third
person whose wrongful act or neglect caused the loss. Thus if a casualty
company insured X against damage to his automobile and X’s automobile was
injured by the negligence of Y, the casualty company would be subrogated
to the rights of X against Y.
(e) General average is the contribution by all the parties in a sea adventure
to make good the loss sustained by one of their number on account of sacrifices
voluntarily made of part of the ship or cargo to save the residue and the lives
of those on board from an impending peril, or for extraordinary expense neces
sarily incurred by one or more of the parties for the general benefit of all the
interests embarked on the enterprise.
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No. 12 (10 points):
State the general principles underlying a common carrier’s liability for loss
or damage to goods shipped by freight.
Answer:
Carriers are held to be insurers of the goods received by them to be carried,
against all casualties except those arising from acts of God, public enemies, acts
of public authority, inherent nature of the goods, and acts of shipper.
The carrier may restrict his liability as an insurer by contract, but he can not
so restrict his liability for his negligence. In the absence of an express agree
ment, the carrier is not liable for failure to deliver or transport goods at a certain
time, provided they are delivered within a reasonable time.
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